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Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese 
University Students: The Influence of 
Contemporary Nationalist Propaganda 
Min ZHOU and Hanning WANG  
Abstract: This study looks at the sources of anti-Japanese sentiment 
in today’s China. Using original survey data collected in June 2014 
from 1,458 students at three elite universities in Beijing, we quantita-
tively investigate which factors are associated with stronger anti-
Japanese sentiment among elite university students. In particular, we 
examine the link between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 
nationalist propaganda (especially patriotic education) and university 
students’ anti-Japanese sentiment. We find that nationalist propaganda 
does indeed have a significant effect on negative sentiment towards 
Japan. Reliance on state-sanctioned textbooks for information about 
Japan, visiting museums and memorials or watching television pro-
grammes and movies relating to the War of Resistance against Japan 
are all associated with higher levels of anti-Japanese sentiment. The 
findings suggest the effectiveness of nationalist propaganda in pro-
moting anti-Japanese sentiment. We also find that alternative sources 
of information, especially personal contact with Japan, can mitigate 
anti-Japanese sentiment. Thus, visiting Japan and knowing Japanese 
people in person can potentially offset some of the influences of 
nationalist propaganda.  
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Introduction 
Nationalism in contemporary China has caught the attention of many 
China scholars. It has become “one of the most powerful forces of 
collective action” in today’s China (Tang and Darr 2012: 811) and 
sometimes gives rise to street protests against foreign countries. For 
instance, large-scale anti-United States street demonstrations took 
place in 1999; anti-France demonstrations occurred in 2008; and anti-
Japan demonstrations have erupted periodically in recent years. In 
this study, we focus on a prominent manifestation of Chinese nation-
alism: anti-Japanese sentiment. Strongly negative attitudes towards 
Japan are especially popular among the Chinese people and underlie 
the periodic eruption of anti-Japan demonstrations in recent years. 
Recent nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in 2005, 
2010, and 2012. The scale of these street demonstrations often 
shocked outside observers. For instance, during the 2012 anti-Japan 
demonstrations, protest activities were observed in as many as 208 of 
China’s total 287 prefectural cities (Wallace and Weiss 2015; Weiss 
2014). This leads us to ask the question: what are the sources of this 
anti-Japanese sentiment? As part of this enquiry, we conducted a 
large-scale survey of 1,458 students from three elite universities in 
Beijing in June 2014. Original data was used to quantitatively investi-
gate what factors are associated with stronger anti-Japanese sentiment 
among elite university students. In particular, we empirically examine 
the link between the nationalist propaganda (especially patriotic edu-
cation) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the university 
students’ anti-Japanese sentiment.  
Chinese Nationalist Propaganda 
Many scholars point out the role of the CCP government in con-
structing and promoting nationalism in China (Barmé 1993; Coble 
2007; Gries 2004; Gries et al. 2011; He 2007, 2009; Mitter 2000, 2003; 
Reilly 2012; Wang 2008, 2012; Zhao 1998, 2004). Nationalism has 
been exploited by the CCP as a substitute for a communist ideology 
that has lost its appeal with the Chinese public. After the 1989 
Tian’anmen Square pro-democracy protests and starting in the early 
1990s, the CCP intensified its propaganda to promote nationalism. In 
particular, it launched the Patriotic Education Campaign (⡡ഭѫѹᮉ
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㛢⍫ࣘ, aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu huodong) to divert the attention of the public 
and shore up the legitimacy of the CCP government. The propaganda 
has been carried out through both the educational system and the 
mass media. It is promulgated not only in the form of school curric-
ula (especially officially-sanctioned history textbooks), but also in the 
form of broadcast media, films, museums and memorials (Barmé 
1993; Coble 2007; He 2007; Mitter 2000, 2003; Wang 2008, 2012; 
Zhao 1998). 
Although everyone in China can be subject to nationalist propa-
ganda, the Chinese youth have been singled out as the main target 
group. Accounting for a large part of this nationalist propaganda, 
patriotic education is incorporated into the entire process of educa-
tion from “kindergartens all the way through the universities” (Zhao 
1998: 293). Nationalist propaganda focuses on restoring national 
pride and eliminating national humiliation. China’s official media and 
its education system propagate nationalism through repeated empha-
sis on China’s humiliation and victimhood caused by foreign powers 
over the past two centuries. Within this discourse, a particular em-
phasis is placed upon China’s suffering at the hands of aggressive 
Japanese imperialists (Coble 2007; Cohen 2002; Gries 2005; He 2007, 
2009). Japan figures prominently in China’s nationalist propaganda. 
One essential component of this propaganda is the historical memory 
of Japan’s wartime atrocities and its apparent lack of sincerity in com-
ing to terms with this history.  
Despite the fact that much attention has been paid to national-
ism in China and the CCP-led nationalist propaganda (including pat-
riotic education), there have been no empirical studies that quantita-
tively investigate the effect of this nationalist propaganda, especially 
its effect on anti-Japanese sentiment. This study attempts to fill this 
lacuna. We seek to empirically assess the important question: to what 
extent has the CCP-led nationalist propaganda “contributed to an 
aggrieved nationalism among China’s youth”? (Gries et al. 2011: 17). 
Information Diversity 
In addition to nationalist propaganda, another possible source of 
anti-Japanese sentiment in China might be insufficient understanding 
between the people of the two nations. Although China and Japan are 
close neighbours, only separated by the East China Sea, the lack of 
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understanding about each other is often striking (Iriye 1992; Rozman 
2004). On the Chinese side, this lack of knowledge about Japan is 
exacerbated by two factors. Firstly, most Chinese have had little or no 
direct contact with Japan and its people, generally speaking. This 
situation has only changed, to some degree, in recent years as more 
and more Chinese have started to travel overseas. Another factor is 
the CCP’s tight control and censorship over the media and infor-
mation flow. Thus, the channels for obtaining information about 
Japan are limited. Most Chinese have little direct access to foreign 
sources of information; therefore, it is not easy for ordinary Chinese 
people to freely access information from overseas. It is well-known in 
cross-cultural psychological studies that the lack of well-rounded 
knowledge about other groups of people can lead to misunderstand-
ing, prejudice, and negative impressions (Chin 2010; Oskamp 2008). 
This lack of information diversity, including foreign information 
sources and direct contact with Japan, may also potentially contribute 
to China’s anti-Japanese sentiment. In contrast, greater access to for-
eign information sources and direct contact with Japan may have the 
potential to reduce negative sentiment towards Japan.  
We further explore whether individuals with greater information 
diversity are less prone to the manipulation of the state. With alterna-
tive (especially foreign) sources of information and direct contact 
with Japan, individuals may be less likely to take in the CCP-led na-
tionalist propaganda. Drawing on foreign information sources and 
personal contact, they may see a multifaceted Japan or even another 
Japan that differs greatly from the image constructed by the national-
ist propaganda. Thus, diverse information might dilute or even chal-
lenge the information received from the state propaganda. Hence, the 
influence of the nationalist propaganda may become weaker or even 
become insignificant when an individual has foreign information 
sources and direct contact with Japan. In other words, there may be a 
negative interaction effect between nationalist propaganda and in-
formation diversity on anti-Japanese sentiment. Nevertheless, it is 
also likely that there is no interaction effect. Nationalist propaganda 
can have a deep and entrenched impact, because it operates at almost 
every stage of schooling and in many forms of the media. Its influ-
ence may still exist even when people have alternative channels to 
gain knowledge about Japan. 
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Taken together, this study empirically addresses three interrelat-
ed questions on anti-Japanese sentiment among elite university stu-
dents in Beijing. First, does nationalist propaganda actually promote 
anti-Japanese sentiment? Second, does more alternative information 
reduce anti-Japanese sentiment? Third, can information diversity 
undermine the impact of nationalist propaganda on anti-Japanese 
sentiment?  
The Data: Three Elite Universities in Beijing 
In June 2014, we conducted a large-scale survey and chose three elite 
universities in Beijing as the sampling sites. Beijing is usually the centre 
of political activism in China (Zhao 2002). It is closer to the political 
centre and possesses the largest number of higher education institu-
tions in China. Survey studies on attitudes towards world affairs, 
including nationalist attitudes, are often conducted in Beijing (Gries 
et al. 2011; Johnston 2004; Sinkkonen 2013; Zhao 2002). We focus 
on university students in light of their prominent role in major social 
movements in China’s modern history. As Zhao 888) asserts, the 
political attitudes of today’s university students “will shape tomor-
row’s Chinese politics” (Zhao 2002: 888). 
Following previous empirical studies on nationalism among Chi-
nese students (Sinkkonen 2013; Yu and Zhao 2006; Zhao 2002, 
2003), we conducted the survey in Peking University, Tsinghua Uni-
versity, and Renmin (People’s) University of China. Of the many 
universities in Beijing, these three are “among the most prestigious 
and have exerted a great impact on students in other universities and 
on Chinese politics” and are thus the “vanguard of student activism” 
in the city (Zhao 2002: 888). Students from the three universities are 
also likely to “assume leading roles in society after graduating” (Sink-
konen 2013: 1048). We selected these three universities for this same 
reason. 
The final sample size was 1,458, with 504 students from Peking 
University, 467 from Tsinghua University, and 487 from Renmin 
University. The probability sampling method used was a modified 
form of two-stage clustering sampling based on the types of on-
campus student dormitories. In all three universities, almost all the 
students live on campus except for a very small number of married 
graduate students. In each institution, there are different types of 
  Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese University Students 173 

dormitory rooms with one to six students living in them. We first 
sampled the dormitory rooms based on room type and then selected 
one or two students from each selected room. We selected one stu-
dent from dormitory rooms with three or less students and two stu-
dents from dormitory rooms with four or more students to complete 
the questionnaires. The different probabilities for a student to be 
selected in different room types required separate sampling for differ-
ent room types. Eventually, the probability of a student being select-
ed into the final sample was the product of the probabilities at the 
two stages, that is, (1) the probability of each room being selected 
multiplied by (2) the probability of each person being selected from 
the room. We set this probability to be the sample size divided by the 
population size. In the sampling, all students have an equal chance of 
being selected into the final sample.  
The overall response rate based on the strict probability sam-
pling was 72.5 per cent. To increase the response rate, we adopted 
additional techniques. If the selected student refused to complete the 
questionnaire, another student in the same room would be chosen 
randomly. If there were not enough students willing to participate in 
that room, one or two students in the nearest room would be select-
ed. These techniques of filling non-responses increased the response 
rate to almost 100 per cent and reduced the impact of non-responses.  
The final sample included students from throughout China: they 
came from all 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four munici-
palities, two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau), 
and Taiwan. In the sample, the average age was 22 years. A total of 
54.05 per cent of the participants were male (N=788) and 45.95 per 
cent were female (N=670). The participants in the sample were pre-
dominantly Han ethnicity (89.71 per cent), while minority groups 
made up the remaining 10.29 per cent. Undergraduate and graduate 
students constituted 67 per cent and 33 per cent of the participants, 
respectively. These numbers well represent the overall profile of the 
student body in these universities. Careful sampling and data collec-
tion gave us confidence in the final sample’s representativeness of the 
student population in the three universities. The questionnaire, de-
tailed survey methods, and data can be found at <www.minzhou.ca/ 
research.html>. 
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Dependent Variable 
We surveyed students’ general attitudes towards Japan by posing the 
question: “How do you feel about Japan in general?” The responses 
were recorded on the following five-point scale: “Like Japan very 
much” (1), “Like Japan somewhat” (2), “Neutral” (3), “Dislike Japan 
somewhat” (4), and “Dislike Japan very much” (5). This dependent 
variable was ordinal. A higher score suggests a greater level of nega-
tive sentiment towards Japan. 
Key Independent Variables 
The first set of key independent variables related to nationalist propa-
ganda. The CCP employs a variety of tools to implement nationalist 
propaganda. We used a series of variables. The first variable was his-
tory textbooks. The survey asked students about the importance of 
history textbooks as their source of information about Japan. This 
textbook variable was binary with “1” indicating “very important” 
and “0” denoting “not important.”  
The second variable was visiting memorials or museums relating 
to the War of Resistance against Japan (ᣇᰕᡈҹ, Kangri zhanzheng; 
also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War). The survey asked 
students whether they had ever visited any memorials or museums 
relating to the War of Resistance against Japan. The third variable was 
the viewing of television programmes or films about the War of Re-
sistance against Japan. The survey asked students whether they had 
ever watched any television programmes or films about the War of 
Resistance against Japan. Both variables were binary with “1” indicat-
ing “yes” and “0” indicating “no.” As part of the propaganda effort, 
many memorials and museums have been established or expanded to 
commemorate the War of Resistance against Japan, and many televi-
sion programmes and films have been produced on the theme of the 
War of Resistance against Japan. These memorials, museums, televi-
sion programmes, and films usually highlight the atrocities committed 
by the Japanese armies, the suffering of ordinary Chinese, and the 
leadership of the CCP in resisting Japanese aggression.  
The second set of key independent variables was about infor-
mation diversity, especially whether students have alternative chan-
nels to gain knowledge about Japan outside of state-controlled chan-
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nels. This set of variables included whether they have access to for-
eign sources of information and whether they have direct contact 
with Japan and its people. Access to foreign sources of information 
was measured by the question: “Will you be able to access news from 
foreign sources if you want to?” Direct contact with Japan and its 
people was captured by two variables: experience of visiting Japan 
(“Have you ever visited Japan?”) and knowing Japanese people (“Do 
you know any Japanese people in person?”). All three variables were 
binary with “1” indicating “yes” and “0” indicating “no.” 
We also created nine interaction variables between the first set 
(nationalist propaganda) and the second set (information diversity) – 
specifically, between textbooks and foreign information, textbooks 
and visiting Japan, textbooks and knowing Japanese people, memori-
als and foreign information, memorials and visiting Japan, memorials 
and knowing Japanese people, TV and foreign information, TV and 
visiting Japan, and TV and knowing Japanese people.  
Control Variables 
In the analysis, we also controlled basic socio-demographic character-
istics. Gender was a dummy variable, with male coded as “1” and 
female as “0.” Family income was measured through the question: 
“How much is your parents’ total monthly income approximately?” 
The responses were on a nine-point scale: lower than 1,000 CNY (1), 
1,000–2,000 CNY (2), 2,000–4,000 CNY (3), 4,000–6,000 CNY (4), 
6,000–8,000 CNY (5), 8,000–10,000 CNY (6), 10,000–15,000 CNY 
(7), 15,000–20,000 CNY (8), and over 20,000 CNY (9). Thus, a larger 
number indicates a higher family income. Membership of the CCP 
was also a binary variable, with “1” indicating a CCP member and “0” 
a non-CCP member. Ethnicity was measured as a binary variable, 
with Han coded as “1” and non-Han as “0.” Household registration 
or hukou (ᡧਓ) type was also binary, with rural residents coded as “1” 
and urban residents as “0.” Region was measured by a series of 
dummy variables including East China, Northeast China, North Chi-
na, Central China, South China, Northwest China, Southwest China, 
and other (areas outside mainland China, including Hong Kong, Ma-
cau, and Taiwan).  
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Analyses and Results 
Table 1 summarises the basic descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis. Figure 1 further shows the distribution of the 
dependent variable on students’ general attitudes towards Japan. 
More than half (30.63 per cent + 19.51 per cent = 50.14 per cent) of 
all sampled students expressed a clear dislike of Japan, while only 13 
per cent (1.85 per cent + 11.26 per cent = 13.11 per cent) said they 
liked Japan to some degree. In particular, a substantial proportion 
(close to 20 per cent) disliked Japan very much. Overall, general atti-
tudes towards Japan were very negative among the sampled university 
students. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Negative sentiment towards Japan 3.547 .987 1 5
Gender (male) .540 .499 0 1
Family income 5.222 2.003 1 9
CCP membership .314 .464 0 1
Ethnicity (Han) .897 .296 0 1
Household type (rural) .218 .413 0 1
Region: 
East China .270 .444 0 1
Northeast China .097 .297 0 1
North China .192 .394 0 1
Central China .161 .368 0 1
South China .079 .255 0 1
Southwest China .114 .318 0 1
Northwest China .077 .266 0 1
Other (non-mainland China) .010 .101 0 1
History textbook .243 .429 0 1
Visiting memorial/museum .681 .466 0 1
Watching TV/movie .905 .293 0 1
Foreign information .698 .459 0 1
Travelling to Japan .079 .270 0 1
Knowing Japanese people .242 .428 0 1
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Figure 1: Students’ General Attitudes towards Japan 
Next, regression modelling was used to identify the variables that 
have significant influences on general attitudes towards Japan. Given 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we chose ordered logit 
regression. A battery of regression models was estimated with differ-
ent modelling specifications. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Ordinal Logit Regression of Negative Sentiment towards Japan 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Gender (male) .582***(.100)
.619***
(.102)
.562***
(.102)
.596***
(.103)
.599*** 
(.100) 
.299*** 
Family income -.066*(.027)
-.070**
(.027)
-0.49*
(.025)
-.051*
(.028)
-.068** 
(.025) 
-.136** 
CCP member-
ship 
.189
(.106)
.190
(.107)
.186
(.108)
.177
(.109)   
Ethnicity (Han) .035(.169)
.050
(.171)
-.013
(.173)
-.001
(.174)   
Household 
type (rural) 
.129
(.126)
.181
(.129)
.147
(.129)
.177
(.131)   
Region:   
Northeast 
China 
.172
(.187)
.157
(.190)
.180
(.189)
.168
(.191)   
North China .100(.145)
.107
(.145)
.154
(.149)
.156
(.149)   
Central China .037(.154)
.056
(.155)
.039
(.155)
.065
(.155)   
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
South China -.241 (.206) 
-.200
(.207)
-.219
(.211)
-.176
(.211)  
Southwest 
China 
-.300 
(.170) 
-.257
(.172)
-.269
(.172)
-.221
(.173)  
Northwest 
China 
.119 
(.205) 
.172
(.205)
.174
(.206)
.235
(.206)  
Other (non-
mainland 
China) 
-1.713** 
(.587) 
-1.440*
(.605)
-1.226*
(.582)
-1.202*
(.596)
-1.263*
(.516)
-.127* 
History 
textbook  
.238*
(.115)
.242*
(.118)
.259*
(.115)
.111* 
Visiting 
memori-
al/museum 
 
.126*
(.060)
.123*
(.062)
.126*
(.061)
.080* 
Watching 
TV/movie  
.704***
(.186)
.577**
(.198)
.623**
(.190)
.183** 
Foreign 
information  
.052
(.108)
-.027
(.112)
 
Traveling to 
Japan  
-.559**
(.208)
-.579**
(.209)
-.504*
(.201)
-.136* 
Knowing 
Japanese 
people 
 
-.575***
(.123)
-.565***
(.124)
-.572***
(.121)
-.245*** 
Model fit 
Statistics: 
  
Log-likelihood -1884.4*** -1860.1*** -1827.5*** -1812.0*** -1819.4*** -1819.4*** 
R2 .074 .106 .123 .142 .136 .136 
Notes: (1) N = 1458;  
(2) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
(3) From two-tailed tests, * P<.05; ** P<.01; *** P<.001;  
(4) For “region” dummy variables, in Models 1–4 East China is the reference 
group and thus omitted, while in Models 5–6 the reference group becomes all 
regions within mainland China. 
First, we estimated a baseline model, Model 1, which only contained 
basic socio-demographic variables. Of these socio-demographic vari-
ables, only gender, family income, and other region (non-mainland 
China) have significant effects on negative sentiment towards Japan. 
Male students tended to hold more negative sentiment than female 
students, and students from less well-off family backgrounds disliked 
Japan more than their better-off counterparts. Students from outside 
mainland China showed less negative attitudes towards Japan in 
comparison with mainland Chinese students. 
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Second, building on baseline Model 1, we examined the effects 
of nationalist propaganda. Model 2 further included variables repre-
senting history textbooks, visiting memorials or museums, and watch-
ing television or films. All of the variables relating to nationalist propa-
ganda had significantly positive coefficients, so they all increased 
negative sentiment towards Japan. People under greater influence of 
nationalist propaganda were more likely to develop more negative 
sentiment towards Japan.  
Third, we added information diversity variables, including for-
eign information sources, experience of visiting Japan, and knowing 
Japanese people in person, to the baseline Model 1, which produced 
Model 3. All of these variables representing alternative channels for 
getting to know Japan had negative coefficients, so they all decreased 
negative sentiment. Having access to foreign information sources, 
experience of visiting Japan and knowing Japanese people in person 
all depressed negative sentiment towards Japan. In particular, the 
effects of visiting Japan and knowing Japanese people were statistical-
ly significant, while having access to foreign information sources was 
not. Personal experiences were particularly effective in altering stu-
dents’ negative attitudes towards Japan. 
Fourth, we brought both nationalist propaganda and information 
diversity variables into the modelling and arrived at the complete 
model, Model 4. All previous findings held. All three nationalist 
propaganda variables promoted negative sentiment towards Japan, 
while all three information diversity variables, especially the two per-
sonal experience variables, reduced negative sentiment. 
Next, the different interaction terms between the nationalist 
propaganda variables and the information diversity variables were 
tested. None of the interactions had any significant effect. Hence, the 
hypothesised interaction effect between nationalist propaganda and 
information diversity was not supported. The lack of interaction ef-
fect suggests that nationalist propaganda is influential whether the 
individual has alternative information sources or not.  
Fifth, we applied the stepwise modelling procedure to the mod-
elling. Instead of specifying a model with certain variables ex ante, the 
process was modelled and the stepwise model selection technique 
was allowed to select relevant variables into the final model. The final 
model, Model 5, confirmed that all the nationalist propaganda vari-
ables and the personal contact with Japan variables were significantly 
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associated with attitudes towards Japan. The results were consistent 
with those from the previous models. Nationalist propaganda pro-
moted negative sentiment towards Japan, whereas diverse infor-
mation, especially personal contact with Japan, decreased negative 
sentiment. No interaction terms were selected into the final model, 
indicating a lack of interaction effect between nationalist propaganda 
and information diversity. 
Finally, to compare the relative importance of these significant 
variables, we further estimated a model that uses standardised coeffi-
cients. First, all explanatory variables were rescaled and transformed 
into standardised scores (with a mean of zero and a variance of one). 
Then we re-estimated Model 5 with these standardised variables. The 
results were presented in Model 6. The standardised variables were 
unit-free so their effects were now comparable. By comparing the 
standardised coefficients, we were able to examine which variables 
had greater effects. Of the significant variables, gender (being male), 
knowing Japanese people in person, and watching anti-Japanese tele-
vision or films had the greatest impact on negative sentiment towards 
Japan, followed by income, visiting Japan, coming from outside main-
land China, history textbooks, and visiting memorials or museums. 
Therefore, of the nationalist propaganda variables, television and 
films were the most effective, followed by history textbooks. Memor-
ials and museums were the least effective in fostering anti-Japanese 
sentiment. It is also worth noting that personal contact with Japan 
was very effective at mitigating negative sentiment towards Japan. In 
some cases, the mitigating effect of personal contact with Japan ri-
valled and potentially offset the nationalism-promoting effect of na-
tionalist propaganda. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
There has been much discussion of the role of the CCP-led national-
ist propaganda (including patriotic education) in inciting prejudice 
against foreign countries, Japan in particular. This study is the first 
attempt to quantitatively evaluate the actual effect of this propaganda 
on anti-Japanese sentiment. Among elite university students in Bei-
jing, nationalist propaganda does have a significant effect on levels of 
negative sentiment towards Japan. Dependence on state-sanctioned 
textbooks for information about Japan, visiting museums and memor-
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ials, and watching television programmes and movies relating to the 
War of Resistance against Japan are all associated with more intense 
anti-Japanese sentiment. This study provides empirical evidence in 
support of a link between nationalist propaganda and anti-Japanese 
sentiment. It seems that the CCP has no intention of loosening its 
propaganda effort any time soon. In January 2016, for instance, the 
Ministry of Education issued another directive calling for patriotic 
education to “suffuse each stage and aspect of schooling” (Buckley 
2016). We conjecture that, as the CCP continues or even intensifies 
its nationalist propaganda, nationalism – including anti-Japanese sen-
timent – in China will remain salient. 
Diverse information channels are associated with less negative 
sentiment towards Japan. In particular, personal contact with Japan 
provides direct channels for learning about Japan beyond state propa-
ganda, which may help to mitigate anti-Japanese sentiment. As more 
and more Chinese visit Japan and get into direct contact with Japan 
and its people, these Chinese have alternative channels for gaining 
knowledge about Japan. Direct contact with Japan exposes them to 
today’s Japan which differs from the historical images depicted in 
China’s domestic media. The Chinese people who travel to Japan 
develop more positive attitudes towards Japan as a result. Therefore, 
promoting Japan-bound tourism may be an effective way of improv-
ing the Chinese people’s attitudes towards Japan.  
It is also interesting to note that there is an absence of inter-
action effect between nationalist propaganda and information diversi-
ty. Although personal contact with Japan may improve students’ atti-
tudes towards Japan, the influences of nationalist propaganda are still 
at work even for those who have personal contact with Japan. There-
fore, nationalist propaganda is widely effective in promoting anti-
Japanese sentiment. Nationalist propaganda, such as patriotic educa-
tion, is instilled in students from a very young age and covers many 
stages and aspects of schooling. Its impact can be deeply ingrained 
into students and remains influential even when students have alter-
native information sources. Nevertheless, the lack of any interaction 
effect also highlights the effectiveness of personal contact with Japan 
in mitigating anti-Japanese sentiment. Regardless of the extent of the 
influence of nationalist propaganda, having direct contact with Japan 
consistently improves attitudes towards Japan. Even for those who 
are heavily influenced by state propaganda, personal contact with 
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Japan is just as effective at mitigating anti-Japanese sentiment. Over-
all, nationalist propaganda and personal experiences both operate 
effectively but independently in influencing people’s attitudes towards 
Japan. 
Last but not least, we reflect on the limitations of this study. This 
study empirically confirms the presence of a link between nationalist 
propaganda and anti-Japanese sentiment. Thus, people who are under 
greater influence from state propaganda tend to be more anti-Japan-
ese. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the survey data, we 
should refrain from jumping to strong causal conclusions. There can 
be unobserved confounding variables (such as a family history of 
suffering during the Japanese invasion) that make people both more 
prone to propaganda and more anti-Japanese. Reverse causality is also 
a possibility, especially in the case of watching anti-Japanese television 
or movies and visiting memorials or museums. Individuals with 
stronger anti-Japanese sentiment may be more willing and more likely 
to watch anti-Japanese television or movies and to visit memorials or 
museums. This reverse causality is less likely in the case of history 
textbooks, though, because all students must study state-sanctioned 
textbooks at school. To better establish causality it would be helpful 
to collect longitudinal data to survey individuals before and after 
exposure to nationalist propaganda. For example, we might survey 
individuals’ sentiment towards Japan before they visited a memorial 
and then survey them again after the visit. This type of data would be 
more effective in establishing causality. 
Finally, this survey was conducted at three elite universities in 
Beijing, so the group under study is the student body of these univer-
sities. We should avoid over-generalising the findings here to all uni-
versity students around China, let alone other social groups. The elite 
university students under study possess unique characteristics. They 
are admitted into top universities so they may be among the best at 
studying in their high schools or even regions. They are likely to be 
diligent students who pay close attention to school curricula and pro-
grammes, and thus are potentially more prone to patriotic education. 
By the same token, they are also likely to be some of the most intelli-
gent students from all over China and may have more potential to 
become independent and critical thinkers. In this sense, they may 
develop their own independent assessment of Japan and are less likely 
to be manipulated by state propaganda. Considering these two com-
  Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese University Students 183 

peting perspectives, it remains an open empirical question whether 
elite university students are more or less prone to nationalist propa-
ganda. In future research it would be interesting to compare this elite 
student group with other social groups. The comparison would fur-
ther our understanding about the influence of nationalist propaganda 
on elite university students, a group likely to take on leadership roles 
and thus have a great impact on Chinese society in the future. 
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